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Abstract 
 
The devaluations of the 1930s facilitated a faster recovery from the Great Depression in the 
countries depreciating, but their unilateral manner provoked retaliatory commercial policies 
abroad. This paper explores the importance of the retaliatory motive in French trade policy 
during the 1930s and its effects on trade. Relying on a novel dataset of bilateral tariff rates and 
a difference in differences approach, the quantification of the protectionist response suggests 
that retaliation was an important motive behind increasing tariffs. The resulting beggar-my-
neighbour penalty reduced trade to a similar degree that modern regional trade agreements 
foster trade. Furthermore, the analysis of contemporary newspapers reveals that the 
devaluations of the early 1930s triggered a lasting Anglo-French trade conflict marked by tit-
for-tat protectionist policies. Overall, the quantitative and qualitative results indicate that the 
unilateral currency depreciations came at a high price in political and economic terms. 
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Introduction
After China’s alleged currency manipulation in the early 2000s and American and Japanese
quantitative easing in the recent crisis, exchange rate policies have become as much of a political
battleground as an academic field over the last decade.1 At the heart of such debates is the ar-
gument that the country deliberately undervaluing its currency significantly gains at the expense
of others. A lower real exchange rate stimulates exports, which in turn creates current account
problems abroad (Goldstein and Lardy, 2006). Retaliatory tariffs, it is frequently invoked (see e.g.
Krugman, 2010), could alleviate the pain by partly offsetting the misalignment and provide a cure
by ultimately forcing policymakers to re-align the allegedly undervalued currency. Therapy, how-
ever, might fail as retaliatory tariffs carry a strong political economy implication and thus provide
a breeding ground for trade wars. The exchange rate and tariff policies of the 1930s provide a
blueprint for such a worst-case scenario, but so far we know little about the relative magnitude of
such retaliatory policies and their effect on trade.
When Britain had unilaterally left the gold standard in the autumn of 1931 and other countries
followed suit soon after, policymakers in these countries had not intended to manipulate their
currencies. However, their counterparts abroad perceived the exit from gold as such. At the
forefront, French policymakers retaliated by raising tariffs and introducing quotas specifically
aimed at those countries that had left the gold standard. Indeed, contemporary and more recent
contributions (see e.g. Liepmann, 1938; Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010) have mentioned this episode
anecdotally and Haim Shamir (1989) referred to it as the Franco-British trade war. Unfortunately,
no detailed study on the force of this retaliation relative to the general increase of protectionism
exists. How important was this element in French protectionism in the interwar period? What
were the effects on trade and commercial policy more generally?
The French commercial policy reaction was emblematic for the last of three stages of inter-
war protectionism, which contemporary Harvard economist George Roorbach (1933) identified.
In the first phase of the Depression governments followed the classical protectionist motive and
imposed tariffs to reduce competition for domestic producers. In a second phase, they resorted to
more protectionism, now including quotas, to balance their budgets and to protect their currencies.
Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin (2010) put forward a trilemma framework in a similar vein
to analyse the varying degrees of protectionism across countries. They show convincingly that
countries more reluctant to leave the gold standard became more protectionist. On the other hand,
leaving the gold standard gave way to a third stage of protectionism, in which countries resorted
1Whether justified or not, the Obama administration and his successor-elect have suggested that China was manip-
ulating its currency (N. Irwin, 2016). Furthermore, it attracts attention from fields spanning from trade (Staiger and
Sykes, 2010) to economic growth (Rodrik, 2008). See Eichengreen (2013) for a comparison to the 1930s.
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to discriminatory commercial policies. In contrast to the previous two stages, quotas, tariffs, and
exchange controls were often directed at specific countries. This “pernicious” bilateralism (Irwin,
1993b) has become exemplary for the disintegrating commercial world in the interwar period.2
This study substantiates the view that the third stage of protectionism mattered qualitatively and
quantitatively for the breakdown of world trade. In line with Shamir (1989), the analysis of con-
temporary newspapers reveals a change in public discourse, in which retaliatory sentiment gained
momentum after the devaluations. On the empirical side, this study makes two contributions by
analysing a largely neglected dimension of tariff data. In contrast to other economic powers of
the time, French statisticians recorded tariff revenues on a bilateral level. This facilitates the cal-
culation of bilateral protection rates. With this measure at hand, one can reasonably distinguish
between general tariff increases and those directed at certain trading partners using a difference in
differences approach. Whereas the general increase in tariffs amounted to 5 %, the discretionary
increases against devaluing countries, the beggar-my-neighbour penalty, accounted for an addi-
tional tariff increase of 7.5 %. The absolute magnitude of the penalty is thus similar to the tariff
reductions reached through modern treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(Burfisher et al., 2001). A back-of-the-envelope calculation and an empirical estimate of the ef-
fect on trade suggest that the penalty reduced imports from devaluing countries by about 20 %.
Ironically, while the devaluations of the 1930s relieved the pressure to become more protectionist
in countries with depreciated currencies, they were a direct impetus for more discretionary and
retaliatory tariff policies abroad.
The results of this study have two major implications. In terms of the historiography of the
Great Depression, they elucidate the relative importance of retaliation as a complementary ex-
planation for the rise of protectionism. Regarding the devaluations, one might still agree with
Eichengreen (2013, p. 431) that “effective international coordination was impossible to achieve”
and that they were “part of the solution, not part of the problem.” However, the magnitude of their
economic and political costs raises doubts about their unqualified benevolent assessment in the
literature, which Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs (1985) had initially cautioned against. In
terms of economic policy, this study highlights the importance of international policy coordina-
tion. Unilateral devaluations and protectionist reactions thereto can have large devastating effects.
Even if seemingly impossible at times, it appears to be more promising to fight an alleged currency
manipulation with diplomacy than risking a situation similar to that of the 1930s.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the relevant literature
2See also the views of the contemporaries (League of Nations, 1936, Chapter 6). Michael Kitson and Solomos
Solomou (1995) are critical of this notion and the gravity literature can be interpreted in a similar manner (Eichengreen
and Irwin, 1995; Wolf and Ritschl, 2011; Gowa and Hicks, 2013).
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in two parts. It summarises contemporary and more recent scholarship on the devaluations of
the 1930s and their link to commercial policies. It then briefly places interwar France in this
exchange rate-commercial policy nexus by discussing her metamorphosis from the alleged villain
to the victim of exchange rate policies. With a focus on the Anglo-French relationship, Section
2 provides a qualitative account of the relation between the devaluations and discretion in French
tariff setting, highlighting the escalating economic nationalism. Equipped with the lessons from
the qualitative analysis, Section 3 quantifies the force of the retaliatory response and investigates
the effects on trade.
1. Parity choices and commercial policy consequences in the interwar period
As previous research on the interwar period suggests, one cannot treat commercial and ex-
change rate policies independently in this episode. Hence, the first part of this section discusses
recent scholarship, which links the rise of protectionism to the gold standard. Countries that had
left the gold standard early felt less pressure to become protectionist. However, devaluations like
those of the 1930s can be beggar-my-neighbour and might thus exacerbate general protectionist
tendencies by provoking retaliation. Indeed, contemporary scholars made a strong connection be-
tween the devaluations, the following retaliation and the corresponding increase in the overall level
of protectionism. Relying on the France-focused interwar literature, the second part of the section
illustrates the French metamorphosis from the villain to the victim of exchange rate policies. After
returning at a presumably undervalued parity, she found herself confronted with roughly a dou-
bling of the real value of the franc against the pound. The commercial law equipped policymakers
with several commercial policy devices, which they employed to retaliate for the devaluations.
Devaluations and the Rise of Protectionism
For explaining the “trade policy disaster” in the interwar period, Eichengreen and Irwin (2010)
and Irwin (2012) advance a modified macroeconomic trilemma illustrating the policymakers’ con-
straints. They could pick only two of the following three policies: a fixed exchange rate, open
trade, and independent monetary policy. Bound by their gold standard orthodoxy, i.e. the refusal
to leave the gold standard, some resorted to protectionist policies such as quotas and tariffs to
protect the value of their currency rather than reducing it. The trilemma explanation provides us
with a powerful framework to understand what probably had set the general protectionist move-
ment in motion besides the more classical motives such as an unemployment. However, Irwin’s
evidence teaches us much less about the political economy implications of these devaluations as
he relies on aggregate rather than bilateral tariff measures. Why would countries retaliate against
the devaluations pursued by other countries?
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Inspired by the theoretical and empirical work by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985, 1986), a broad
consensus on the positive effect of the devaluations for the depreciating countries emerged.3 Coun-
tries that had left the gold standard early, tended to recover faster. For those who stayed, Eichen-
green and Sachs point out two counteracting effects. On the one hand, they would lose compet-
itiveness as their exports would be relatively more expensive. On the other, gold inflows from
devaluing countries could ease monetary conditions. This could outweigh the demand shift and
“thus, a devaluation under a gold standard may or may not be beggar-thy-neighbor[...]” (Eichen-
green and Sachs, 1986, p. 70). However, Eichengreen and Sachs (1985, p. 943) conclude that
the devaluations were in fact beggar-my-neighbour as depreciating countries on average acquired
gold stocks in the aftermath of the devaluations.4
This assessment resonates well with contemporary scholarship. It was in the 1930s that Joan
Robinson (1937, pp. 210–228) popularised5 the “beggar-my-neighbour” term by comparing the
commercial policy environment to the famous card game with explicit references to the devalu-
ations. She (1937, p. 210f) described what economists nowadays call a non-cooperative game:
“In times of general unemployment a game of beggar-my-neighbour is played between the na-
tions, each one endeavouring to throw a larger share of the burden upon the others. As soon as
one succeeds in increasing its trade balance at the expense of the rest, others retaliate, and the
total volume of international trade sinks continuously [...].”
Robinson’s stance was far from isolated. Other contemporary economists emphasised the bi-
lateral consequences of the devaluations. Amongst other reasons for the rise of protectionism,
Heinrich Liepmann (1938, p. 361–364) pointed to retaliation for exchange rate depreciation. In
his free trade manifesto, Ranald M. Findlay (1934) bemoaned the retaliation of twenty other na-
tions after the devaluations, particularly emphasising paradigm shifts away from free trade such
as in the Netherlands (Findlay, 1934, p. 31). Roorbach (1933, p. 89f) argued explicitly that the
devaluation “resulted in a movement for still further restrictions of imports by the gold standard
countries” or in the words of MacKintosh (1936, p. 1): the “protectionist plea is most likely to be
heard when he [the producer] is asking to be protected against a fresh threat to his position.”6
In sum, the trilemma view on the rise of protectionism can explain why tariffs rose in the first
3See for example: Campa (1990), Bernanke (1995), and Mitchener and Wandschneider (2015).
4Given the large body of literature referencing their study without or little qualification, it is important to point out
that Eichengreen and Sachs (1985, p. 946) criticise both, the reluctance of some countries to leave the gold standard
and the failed coordination of the devaluations. Typically studies only highlight the positive aspects of the currency
depreciations (e.g. Bernanke, 1995) or stress the theoretical outcome of them not being beggar-my-neighbour per se
(e.g. Campa, 1990), but do not acknowledge their beggar-my-neighbour character.
5See Irwin (2012, p. 125). Sometimes, it is also referred to as “beggar-thy-neighbour,” but not so in Robinson’s
work.
6Naturally, there were also some sceptics. While acknowledging that the “fear of exchange dumping” increased
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place. However, the devaluations facilitating freer trade were a beggar-my-neighbour policy as
the gold standard literature and contemporary economists suggested. The latter also suggested
that countries retaliated, contributing to the upward spiral in protectionism. Having established
the nexus between the rise of protectionism, the exchange rate regime, beggar-my-neighbour poli-
cies, and retaliatory responses thereto, we can now place this case study in its context and time
by analysing the French metamorphosis from the alleged villain to the victim of exchange rate
policies.
Economic and political instability in interwar France
Figure 1 shows French economic activity and nominal trade data for the period 1925–1936,
indexed to 1928.7 From 1925 until 1928 the French business cycle exhibited high volatility, which
was accompanied by inflation and political instability. Between 1924 and 1926, ten different
governments had ceased to rule (Prati, 1991, p. 221). Only under the presidency of Raymond
Poincaré did French authorities manage to stabilise the currency in the second half of 1926.8
France returned to the gold standard de jure in 1928 by establishing convertibility at one fifth
of the pre-war parity (Mouré, 2002, p. 142–144). Poincaré actually favoured a further revaluation
of the franc. However, the governor of the Banque de France, Moreau, insisted to immediately
restore convertibility. According to Kenneth Mouré (2002, 142), two major arguments drove the
parity choice. First, Britain and Italy experienced severe difficulties when returning to their pre-
war parities. Secondly, throughout the phase of instability the franc was already down to about
10 % of its pre-war parity and a stabilisation at more than 20 % was considered too difficult.
The economic activity estimate substantiates Mouré’s observations. Having just recovered from
a downturn, the necessary deflation for a further revaluation of the currency hardly seemed a
desirable policy option.
Pierre Sicsic (1992) argued that French contemporaries did not consider the franc undervalued
although in fact it was. Their counterparts abroad criticised the undervaluation of the franc. In
trade barriers, Frank Graham and Charles Whittlesey (1934, p. 411) argued in line with Irwin’s (2012) trilemma that
“it is at least equally probable that the attempt to maintain the nominal exchange value of a currency will lead to the
erection of unscalable trade barriers.” Others such as Ethel Dietrich (1933) were worried about the actual mechanics
of setting tariffs aiming at specific countries, pointing to the large number of goods, which were covered by trade
treaties and most favoured nation (MFN) clauses. In practice, however, tariffs could be raised as the next section
shows.
7The index is from a more recent version of Albers and Uebele (2015) and scaled to annual GDP data.
8The precise reason for the stabilisation remains debated. Thomas Sargent (1984) argues that Poincaré could
stabilise the franc by returning to sound fiscal policies. Alessandro Prati (1991) contested this argument by showing
that France already ran a surplus in 1924. He emphasises the role of a new tax law in creating demand for government
bonds and stopping the monetary financing of bond repayments.
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Figure 1: Economic activity and trade in Interwar France (seasonally adjusted)
the beginning of 1928, The Economist estimated the misalignment to be 25 % against the pound
in terms of purchasing power (Hamilton, 1987, p. 146). Some authors link this undervaluation
and France’s alleged sterilisation of gold inflows to the global decrease in prices (Hamilton, 1987;
Irwin, 2010). Doubtlessly, the French accumulation of gold had deflationary effects abroad. How-
ever, to what degree French policy makers “caused the Great Depression” (Johnson, 1997; Irwin,
2010) as opposed to the gold exchange standard system per se is still debated (see e.g. Mazumder
and Wood, 2013). In the light of the volatility of the preceding years, it is not too much of a sur-
prise that France did not return to her pre-war parity. Moreover, Sicsic (1992) demonstrates that
the decision was far from being tactical. Nonetheless, French monetary policy caused unpleasant-
ness elsewhere, especially in Britain (Mouré, 2002, p. 183). It is fair to say, whether justified or
not, that some modern and contemporary economists have pictured France as a villain of exchange
rate policies. In fact, references to the period 1928–1931 shall resurface in discussions after the
British exit from gold (see Section 2).
As the Depression took its course, the first big wave of devaluations occurred in autumn 1931.
The degree of the devaluations was by no means negligible: In real terms, the franc’s value against
the pound roughly doubled in the following years.9 Furthermore, other countries effectively left
the gold standard by imposing exchange controls. As Figure 1 shows, the French trade balance
worsened substantially. As we shall see in more detail in the next section, French policymakers
9Own calculation based on the exchange rate from the Global Financial Database and wholesale prices from
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, 1937).
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reacted more forcefully to the devaluations than their foreign peers had done in 1928. One could
think of 1931 as the year in which France shifted roles from the alleged “villain” to the perceived
“victim” of exchange rate policies.
The discontent with the devaluation translated to an increased imposition of protectionist mea-
sures. Besides the imposition of quotas (Dietrich, 1933), the French tariff law from 1928 facilitated
a large degree of discretion in tariff setting (Sollohub, 1932, p. 406): the government could change
certain tariffs by decree10 and her commercial treaties, despite containing MFN clauses, were so
flexible as to allow parliament to regularly adjust minimum tariff rates. This flexibility and the
room for discretion more generally is perhaps best illustrated by the Canadian consternation and
position on a potential renewal of the Franco-Canadian commercial treaty of 1922. The Bennett
Ministry concluded “that nothing was to be gained by the treaty’s continuance” after France had
repeatedly increased rates on important Canadian export goods (The Economist, 1932a, p. 124).
In sum, the French interwar years were marked by political and economic turbulence. Having
returned to gold at a presumably undervalued parity in 1928 due to the political and economic
turmoil, France might have played an important role in the disastrous decline of the world price
level. In this sense, France had been the villain concerning exchange rate policies. Tables turned
in 1931 when the pound and other foreign currencies dropped sharply in value against the franc.
Those devaluations were beggar-my-neighbour and, given that commercial law equipped French
policymaker with the means to retaliate, one could expect some reaction.
2. The Rhetoric of Retaliation - A Qualitative Account
To understand the harsh reactions and the relevance of retaliation, this section provides a qual-
itative account of the political climate in the interwar policy arena. The importance of retaliatory
tariffs over time is perhaps best summarised by Figure 2. It presents keyword counts from the
Manchester Guardian for expressions related to either retaliation or tariffs more generally. It sug-
gests that, while the tariff question was relevant throughout the 1920s with about 260 counts per
year, retaliation became more topical in the beginning of the 1930s. While it was mentioned a
mere 17 times per year from 1920–1929 on average, the corresponding average for 1930–1933 is
104. The increase in 1930 is clearly in response to the Smoot-Hawley legislation, but it trails the
magnitude of retaliatory sentiment in 1932 by far. In this year, articles with the word combination
“tariff” and “retaliation” appeared on average almost every other day.
In order to add substance to the data and to characterise the general political climate, the fol-
lowing section discusses the French commercial policy based on articles from the Manchester
10The annual summary tables of the Journal Officiel (Tables du Journal Officiel) for the years 1931, 1932, 1933 list
18 decrees in total, often containing multiple orders.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Keywords in the Manchester Guardian
Source: Own calculation from the Manchester Guardian Online Archive provided by ProQuest. “Tariffs” includes
hits of “tariff” or “tariffs” in combination with “exports” or “imports.” Retaliation includes hits of “retaliation” or
“retaliatory” in combination with “tariff” or “tariffs” or articles containing the expression “tariff war.” Advertisements
are excluded. It is important to note that some of these counts might include coincidental hits, but the margin of error
seems small.
Guardian, the Financial Times and The Economist. It is centred on, but not limited to, the Anglo-
French relationship. One can think of this episode in three acts. In the prelude to the devaluations,
the protectionist idea was gaining momentum in France. However, policy measures were more
likely to meet leniency in Britain before 1931 and hopes for cooperation were still present. Af-
ter the devaluations, the rhetoric shifted towards a more nationalistic and retaliatory tone. This
culminated in a perpetuating tit-for-tat game illustrated in the final part of this section.
Prelude
The move towards protectionism had already been visible in France before the crisis of 1931.
She fought a tariff war with Australia around 1930 (Manchester Guardian, 1931h) and, like other
countries, France considered retaliation immediately after the Smoot-Hawley bill was passed in
June 1930 (Manchester Guardian, 1931i). France urged for negotiations and called the American
MFN treatment into question (Manchester Guardian, 1930). While this threat did not materialise,
France discriminated against the United States when she introduced a more draconian quota for
American coal than for coal of other origins in July 1931. In light of the 89 % reduction of the
American quota, the 6 % reduction on British coal seemed modest (Manchester Guardian, 1931g).
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It may have been this comparison that provoked leniency in Britain. The Secretary of Mining,
Shinwell, pointed out that the French quota did not aim to “embarrass” Great Britain, but was an
effort by the French government to protect coal workers. Instead of calls for retaliation, there were
calls for cooperation of the mining industries across Europe (Manchester Guardian, 1931g).
Tariff proposals in Britain remained of “revenue nature” before the end of 1931. In Septem-
ber, the Chancellor of Exchequer, Phillip Snowden, proposed a revenue tariff on luxury goods
(Manchester Guardian, 1931m). As this was a large industry across the channel, this suggestion
was met with “outstanding anxiety” in France (The Economist, 1931f, p. 517). The rhetoric began
to change. Criticising the proposed measures, Rollin, French Minister of Commerce, emphasised
that tariff increases should only be legitimate as countermeasures against unfair competition such
as dumping (Manchester Guardian, 1931n). A British commentator hoped that the tariff menace
could lead to new negotiations about a tariff truce, which had been initiated two years earlier but
failed (Manchester Guardian, 1931o). Such hopes did not materialise, especially after September
20, 1931 when the British devaluation “fell like a bombshell on the [French] market” (French
correspondent in The Economist, 1931b, p. 550). Economic nationalism and tariff war rhetoric
soon replaced international sympathy and leniency. The spirit of cooperation and diplomacy came
under strain.
Immediate Reactions to the Devaluations
The devaluation provoked “great surprise and consternation in French industrial and business
circles” (Naudau, President of French Chamber of Commerce in London in the Financial Times,
1931b). The same was true for policymakers, nevertheless there was the hope that this would stop
the British tariff plans. French Minister of Commerce Rollin commented, “it goes without saying
that if the British Government have been thinking of new tariff measures, now that the depreciation
in sterling constitutes an important bounty for British exporters, they must have given up the idea”
(Manchester Guardian, 1931p). Once again, this illustrates that exchange rate and commercial
policies were linked to the extent that policymakers would equate them.
In the initial weeks after the devaluation of the pound, the public did not perceive the float as a
permanent situation. French newspapers speculated whether the pound will return at par or about
20 % below it (Manchester Guardian, 1931q). Neither this hope nor the one concerning the tariffs
materialised. In Britain, the tariff question became a dominant topic in the run-up to the general
election, with Labour opposing and the conservatives favouring protection (Manchester Guardian,
1931r).11 The conservatives won the election by a large margin (Manchester Guardian, 1931f),
indicating the substantial public support for protectionist policies.
11“At the very moment that a tariff has become not only a superfluity but an absurdity we are to have a general
election, it is generally believed, on that question alone” (Manchester Guardian, 1931r).
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After the devaluations, small instances could trigger intense debates. When Britain announced
the ban of French potatoes due to the Colorado Beetle, the Journée Industrielle considered this a
protectionist measure and called for tariff reprisals (Manchester Guardian, 1931k). About a month
later, the French Minister of Agriculture threatened to ban coal, tea, and whiskey from Britain if the
embargo was not lifted (Manchester Guardian, 1931j). In the meantime, France had banned certain
foodstuff from early October until the end of the year (Manchester Guardian, 1931l). In the case
of butter and beef, this mainly hit two other depreciators, Denmark and Argentina (Manchester
Guardian, 1931l).
In November, France reacted on a large scale to the devaluations. The surtax on goods from
countries with depreciated currencies came into effect on November 14, 1931 (The Economist,
1932b). Certain goods such as grain and tea were exempted from this tariff and this list would
be modified over time. The surtax in its initial form employed different rates across countries: 15
% for Great Britain, Australia, Denmark and Sweden, 10 % for Uruguay and Argentina, 8% for
Norway, and 7 % on British India and the Native States (The Economist, 1931e, p. 956). A month
later the surtax was fixed at 15 % for all these countries. However, given the many exceptions to
it, the change of the tariff level against the individual country would not be equal to this amount.12
Nevertheless, the British Mining Association reported immediate effects materialising in the can-
celation of orders, because British coal exporters had become relatively more expensive for French
importers (Manchester Guardian, 1931a).
Because of this apparent level of discretion and the fact that no other large coal exporter went
off the gold standard, the British industrialists suspected that the surtax unfairly targeted Great
Britain (Manchester Guardian, 1931c). The chamber of commerce argued that the surtax violated
the most-favoured clause, which both countries had agreed upon (Manchester Guardian, 1931d).13
To such criticism, the French Minister of Commerce Louis Rollin responded that the 15% would
still not be enough to compensate for the competitive advantage gained by British manufactures
through the devaluations (The Economist, 1931g, p. 1006). Moreover, a French correspondent
argued that the new exchange rate resembled a 50 % ad valorem tariff. Regarding new proposed
British tariff legislation, the correspondent stated: “The loss to France and to other countries will
be very heavy, and many people here do not hesitate to say that the action of the British Parliament
amounts to a declaration of economic war” (Manchester Guardian, 1931b). Clearly, the French
12While the bilateral tariff rate against countries such as Sweden and Denmark indeed increased by more than 15 %
ad valorem between 1930 and 1932, the same measure for Great Britain “only” doubled from 5 % to 10 % ad valorem.
This seems to be due to the extensive use of exemptions of certain goods from the surtax (e.g. coal at a later point
of time) as a bargaining device. Britain, however, was the exception rather than the rule. The quantitative section
discusses the average effects taking into account all tariff measures rather than only the surtax.
13We shall later see, that the MFN treatment was actually more of an unspoken rule and no such contract existed.
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industrialists did not hesitate to fuel this war. They insisted that the Minister of Commerce should
not lose any time “in taking up the matter with the British government and, if necessary, to start
retaliatory measures” (Financial Times, 1931a).
In sum, the last bits of leniency vanished after the devaluations and agitation took over in press
and politics. The immediate reactions anticipated an upward spiral in protectionism, which is
documented in the following section.
The Upward Spiral of Retaliation
Complementary to the global downward spiral of trade was an upward spiral in retaliation.
Before the introduction of the General Tariff in early 1932,14 the British parliament passed the
Abnormal Importations Act on 17 November, 1931 (The Economist, 1932b). It empowered the
President of the Board of Trade, Runciman, to impose duties on wholly or mainly manufactured
goods of up to 100 % for a duration of 6 months (The Economist, 1931a). One justification for
the tariff was the French surtax. Referencing France’s return to gold at one fifth of its pre-war
parity, the commentator argued that Great Britain could have imposed a tariff of 400 % in 1928
(The Economist, 1931a, p. 944).
With the new tools at hand, retaliation was discussed quite openly in the House of Commons.
Members of parliament considered whether it was legal within the current treaty status to place
special tariffs on French luxury goods and agreed they could (House of Commons, 1931-1932c).15
These discussions also made clear that while Great Britain had received most favoured nation
treatment under an old French law, no binding treaty existed and thus any French tariff imposition
would be legal. Three decrees were issued under the Abnormal Importations Act. These fixed
mostly prohibitive duties of 50 % on a variety of goods. While not aimed at specific countries per
se, the tariff affected the United States, France, Germany and Holland the most as the details of
the first (The Economist, 1931c, p. 994), second (The Economist, 1931i, p. 1061) and the third
schedule (The Economist, 1931h, p. 1221) demonstrate. The Economist (1931h, p. 1220-1223)
argued that the schedules were a small concession to protectionism in statistical terms but not in
principal and concluded that Runciman was playing a “dangerous game.” Despite criticising the
French surtax and discrimination, Runciman pointed out “there is no connection whatever between
that decree and our orders, or the legislation which preceded them” (House of Commons, 1931,
p. 1473).16 Considering the parliamentary debates and his own introduction of the speech, this
statement does not appear overly credible.
14See the analysis of Kitson and Solomou (1990).
15See also O’Connor’s comment concerning the surtax: “Will not the best possible representation [regarding the
French surtax] be made when we have a tariff of our own?” (House of Commons, 1931-1932a) .
16The Economist (1931h) argues that the third schedule was probably not aiming at one specific country.
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French reactions to these emergency tariffs included the reduction of the quota on British coal
less than eight days after the passage of the law (The Economist, 1932b), which was “designed to
restrict entries of British and other foreign fuels” (The Economist, 1931d).17 However, until the
British General Tariff was introduced in the end of February 1932, France also made some con-
cessions. She lifted the surtax on coal in order to obtain favourable treatment for some agricultural
products (Manchester Guardian, 1932c). This bargaining failed, at least at a large scale. It did not
affect the British introduction of the general tariff of 10 % ad valorem (Imports Duty Act), which
came into effect on February 29, 1932 (The Economist, 1932c).
Interestingly, the second section of the general tariff provided the Board of Trade with powers
“to impose supplementary duties in case of foreign discrimination” on top of the general tariff
(House of Commons, 1931-1932b). While the final decision remained with the House of Com-
mons, recommendations were made by the Import Duties Advisory Committee and it appears that
the House always followed those (Capie, 1981, p. 160). Each of the 135 recommendations issued
between 1932 and 193618 included not only one but a list of goods on which additional tariffs
should be charged. Despite its name, the general tariff thus included discretionary elements.
France responded to the general tariff with the introduction of new quotas in “rapid succes-
sion” (Manchester Guardian, 1932d). A particularly draconian example was the quota on British
textile machinery, which reduced import allowances to less than 10 % in 1931 terms (Manch-
ester Guardian, 1932a). These new quotas also covered cotton yarn and piece goods (Manchester
Guardian, 1932b). In the following two years, the above characterisation as a tit-for-tat game
remains true for Anglo-French commercial relations. For instance, a new anti-dumping bill in
December 1932 was introduced, which allowed France to super-impose tariffs of up to 50 % on
all merchandise from countries that treat her less favourably than their other trading partners (The
Economist, 1932d, p. 1081). In 1933, there were still British demands for retaliation against the
surtax (Manchester Guardian, 1933a,c). This demand became even stronger, when France did not
apply the surtax against the United States after the dollar devaluation. The Manchester Guardian
(1933b) argued that France had “fear of annoying the U.S.” The surtax against Britain was only
suppressed from January 1934 onwards (Manchester Guardian, 1934). The quotas remained in
place.
Focusing on the Anglo-French commercial policy relationship, this section has demonstrated
the importance of retaliation following the devaluation of the pound in terms of rhetoric and actions
17Demanding retaliation was not unique to the Anglo-French relationship as experiences in other countries illustrate
(see e.g. Manchester Guardian, 1931e).
18Counted in the House of Commons Archive provided by ProQuest (in 1932: 9 recommendations, 1933: 23, 1934:
36, 1935: 35, 1936: 32). For a more detailed account of this part of the Act, see also the work by Forrest Capie (1981)
on this episode.
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taken. French policymakers understood the unilateral devaluations as a protectionist measure and
retaliated. This led to similar reactions abroad. The “potato instance” vividly illustrates that small
actions could provoke severe threats. This qualitative analysis informs the quantitative part of
this study in two ways. First, trade policy had indeed discretionary elements. Policymakers raised
tariffs against certain countries by targeting their main export goods and by introducing a surtax on
depreciated currencies. Second, quotas soon became the commercial policy tool of choice, which
might render post-1932 tariff rates of secondary importance. However, they remained relevant at
least until 1932 (Section 1).
3. Retaliation - A Quantitative Account
The qualitative evidence suggests that French policymakers perceived the devaluations as a
beggar-my-neighbour policy. They retaliated against what they considered currency manipulation.
How severe was this reaction? Unlike most other studies on protectionism, this study rests on data
on bilateral protection instead of the overall level of protection.19 Combined with a difference
in differences approach, these data enable us to distinguish discretionary tariff setting from the
general increase in tariffs, which could be due to trilemma forces, unemployment or other domestic
pressures. We can then assess the relative importance of retaliation and its consequences for trade.
Data & Summary Statistics
French data on bilateral import values and tariff revenues for the years 1926 until 193320 were
transcribed from the Tableau général du Commerce de la France. To the best of this author’s
knowledge, French statisticians were the only among the main economic powers to record tariff
revenues by trading partner for this period and thus the analysis is naturally confined to France. For
unknown reasons, they halted their data collection efforts after 1933. This is not of great concern
for this analysis as it focuses on the cross-sections of 1930 and 1932, because the devaluations
happened in late 1931.
From these data, we can calculate the average bilateral protection rate tri,t =
Ri,t
Mi,t
, where R is
the tariff revenue and M the value of imports from trading partner i at time t for the years 1926-
1933. If data permitted, it would be preferable to employ even more disaggregated tariff data on the
country-good level21 or to additionally investigate other non-tariff measures such as quotas, which
became increasingly important over time. Unfortunately, no comprehensive data on the latter
19Among the few works that come to mind are the ones by Béatrice Dedinger (2012) on the late 19th century and
by Kazunobu Hayakawa (2013) on modern trade data.
20Unfortunately, the Tableaus themselves do not include any information on whether revenues from the surtax are
included. However, a government memorandum from 1933 suggests so (Ministère des Finances, 1933, p. 133 & 427).
21For its potential relevance, see the now classic and then fierce debate between John Nye (1991) and Irwin (1993a).
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exist to support the impression from the qualitative section of this study that they were also used
disproportionately against devaluing countries. However, the aggregate counterpart of the bilateral
protection rate, the average protection rate, usually provides a good proxy for protectionism (see
e.g. O’Rourke, 2000, p. 462).22 Furthermore, tariffs remained a popular commercial policy tool at
least until 1932.
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A first glance at the data (Figure 3) illustrates the important difference between this and many
other studies on protectionism (e.g. Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010).
Panel (a) plots the mean tariff rate and its standard deviation (that is the cross-sectional variation
for every year) for a balanced panel of 72 French trading partners for the period 1926–1933,
practically covering all French imports. Most studies on protectionism focus on a measure similar
to the solid line above: the average protection rate.23 In contrast, this study focuses on the variation
around the mean and its development over time as captured by the standard deviation in the graph.
22The use of bilateral rather than aggregate trade and tariff data should further mitigate one of the most serious
concerns against this measure. The composition of imports by trading partner is not likely to change drastically from
one year to the other.
23Conventionally, researchers define the average protection rate T as the sum of tariff revenues t of country i from n
trading partners j divided by the sum of i’s importsM from n trading partners j. Hence it represents a trade-weighted
average T =
n∑
j=1
tj/
n∑
j=1
Mj . In contrast, the graph takes the (unweighted) average of the protection rate against all
countries in the sample, which is T =
n∑
j=1
tj
mj
n .
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This variation can be thought of as the level of discretion applied by policymakers and the figure
demonstrates how this level of discretion increased substantially over the years.
The right Panel of Figure 3 is another way to understand this intuition. It plots kernel densities,
a form of smoothed histograms, for three different cross-sections. Suppose that French policy-
makers, just as their British counterparts, would have introduced a general ad valorem tariff of
10 % in 1932. Ignoring potential substitution effects between goods, this would simply shift the
distribution of 1930 along the x-axis by 0.1 without altering its shape. However, the distribution of
1932 is substantially flatter than in 1930 and this means that the discretion has increased besides
the general increase shifting the distribution to the right. Both types of summary statistics tell the
same story - the discretion in tariff setting in France increased substantially in the interwar period,
particularly from 1930 to 1932.
The previous discussions suggest that large parts of this discretion could stem from the retal-
iatory action taken by France against devaluing countries. To test this hypothesis, we can make
use of the data on gold adherence from a variety of sources (League of Nations, 1941; Wolf and
Yousef, 2007; Bernanke and James, 1991; Crafts and Fearon, 2013). This study follows the gen-
eral practice in the literature to focus on the de facto exit dates rather than de jure gold standard
adherence (see e.g. Wolf and Yousef, 2007; Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015). A country is
coded as on gold in the respective year, if it was on the gold standard for at least 6 months of the
year without exchange controls.24
Model
To estimate the force of the retaliatory response - the magnitude of the beggar-my-neighbour
penalty - this study employs a simple difference in differences approach. The exit from gold
by other countries can be considered as purely exogenous. Any endogeneity argument on why
the exit from gold originated from French bilateral tariff policies can be easily dismissed on his-
torical grounds.25 As the treatment occurred in late 1931, the following model compares the
cross-sections of 1930 and 1932:
ln(1 + trit) = α + β∆GSit + ci + tt + it (3.1)
24Taking official suspension dates does not change the results qualitatively, but is uncommon in the literature for a
good reason. With heavy restrictions on the convertibility in place, it is questionable how much of a peg such a regime
represents. For Ireland and Palestine, I take the exit dates for the United Kingdom, for Haiti those of the United States,
and for the French colonies those of France. Colonies are coded according to the trade statistics.
25For example, see Wolf (2008) for a discussion about the structural reasons and Accominotti (2012) for the trigger
for the exit from the gold standard. Furthermore, the countries that had left the gold standard were at various stages
of economic development. It is thus unlikely that tariffs on certain goods independent from the retaliatory motive or
international price effects drive the results.
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where trit is bilateral protection rate against trading partners i and ∆GS is an indicator variable
capturing, whether a country had left the gold standard. It is zero for all countries in t = 1930
and one for the treated countries in t = 1932.26 To operationalise the tariff tr with ln(1 + tr) is
common in studies on tariff setting (see e.g. Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010; Schularick and Solo-
mou, 2011). The term measures the mark-up created by the tariff. ci and tt are country and time
fixed effects respectively and α the constant, which make the above equation a difference in dif-
ferences approach. The time effect t1932 is of particular interest in this very setting as it describes
the average overall increase in the tariff mark-up, whereas β measures the beggar-my-neighbour
penalty, the average effect of retaliation in terms of the change in trade costs. Comparing the two
coefficients shall inform us about the relative magnitude of retaliatory tariff policies in response to
the devaluations.27
Results
Figure 4 presents the baseline result graphically. It plots the mean change in the tariff variable from
1930 to 1932 grouped by gold standard adherence of the trading partner. The average increase in
the markup for those who remained on the gold standard was about 3 % and the corresponding
change for those who had left it was around 12 %. This already suggests that the retaliatory
component, which is the difference between these two estimates, was indeed very important for
French commercial policy in those years. However, it is worthwhile to investigate the validity of
this proposition with different subsamples.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 1 show the result of the OLS estimation for different samples,
ranging from the full sample (1) to a very restricted sample (4).28 The coefficient for the treatment
variable ∆GS ranges from about 0.07 to 0.09. It remains stable when all trading partners with a
share of less than 0.5 % in total French imports are dropped (3). The point estimate is smaller when
the French colonies are excluded (2) as this drops parts of the control group. The average tariff
was smaller for colonies than for other countries. Depending on the point of view, their inclusion
might lead to an overestimation of the retaliatory effect, thus the more conservative estimate in
26In other words, it is the interaction between the treatment group variable (those who are leaving the gold standard)
and the time fixed effect t1932. Naturally, this setup requires to exclude the few countries that either devalued earlier
or were not on the gold standard during this period at all. This is plausible as this study focuses on the retaliation for
the devaluations of 1931 and very few countries had left the gold standard before 1931.
27Any retaliation against foreign tariffs is not taken into account by the model. However, as countries leaving the
gold standard became relatively less protectionist (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010), any bias arising from this omission
should bias strongly against finding significant effects for the retaliation against currency depreciation.
28These results are robust against the exclusion of outliers. The parallel trend assumption is met to a reasonable
degree for most of the subsamples and particularly for the most restrictive sample (4) For the corresponding graphs,
see Appendix A.
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Note: Change in tariff calculated as ln(1 + τ). All countries and colonies are included except for those that had left
the gold standard before 1931.
column (2) is preferred. The most restricted sample (4) applies both restrictions and the coefficient
for the treatment variable remains statistically indistinguishable from the preferred specification.
Unsurprisingly, it loses some of its significance as the sample size shrinks and identification thus
comes from changes in 20 tariff rates only.
We can now assess the relative magnitude of the beggar-my-neighbour penalty by comparing
it to the general increase in tariffs. By definition, the coefficient for the 1932 time fixed effect
captures the general increase in protection or, more formally, the cross-sectional mean of the
difference between 1930 and 1932. This coefficient is consistently smaller than the coefficient
for the treatment variable ∆GS, which measures the discretionary beggar-my-neighbour penalty.
Given the relatively small sample size, we should not overemphasise this difference of the point
estimates. The comparison of the coefficients suggests, however, that the beggar-my-neighbour
penalty was at least as large as the general increase in protectionism for the period under consid-
eration.
To put into perspective the magnitudes implied by these coefficients, consider the following
example of France and her “average” trading partners A (leaving the gold standard) and B (staying
on the gold standard). In 1930, the average protection rate against both countries in sample (2) as
captured by the constant (not shown) was approximately 10 %. A French firm wanting to import
a good for 100 francs from either country A or B would pay 110 francs in total. Two years later,
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Table 1: The Relative Magnitude of the Beggar-my-neighbour Penalty
Dep. variable: ln(1+tr) Imports
Estimator (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (PPML)
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Restriction None No Colonies Import share>0.5 % Restrictions (2&3) None
∆GS 0.0903∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗ 0.0911∗∗ 0.0680∗ -0.301∗∗
(3.95) (2.47) (2.71) (1.94) (-2.22)
Time 1932 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗
(2.74) (2.22) (3.15) (4.34) (-3.72)
N 120 86 56 40 120
R2 0.519 0.545 0.509 0.529
pseudo R2 0.986
t statistics in parentheses. Country fixed effects and constant included but not shown.
Robust standard errors applied (clustered at trading-partner level).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the firm would pay a e.0501 − 1 ≈ 5% markup for imports from either country due to the general
increase in tariffs. This would result in 115 franc in total for import of the good from country B.
Additionally, the French firm would pay a markup of e.0736 − 1 ≈ 7.5% when importing the good
from country A or 122.5 franc in total. The beggar-my-neighbour penalty is thus sizeable and
comparable in magnitude to the average tariff reductions of modern trade treaties.29 What effects
did the penalty have on trade?
The effects on trade
Column (5) shows the estimate of the treatment effect on imports using the PPML estimator
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The specification mirrors the one for tariffs and can be thought
of as a simple import demand function by countries. The coefficient is -0.3 (and significant at the
5% level) thus suggesting an additional e−.3 − 1 ≈ −26% reduction in imports. While the size
of the effect seems intuitively plausible, this result should be treated with care. The estimation
is not theory-consistent and this might lead to biased coefficients.30 While imperfect, we can
29According to Mary Burfisher et al. (2001, p. 127), the US trade-weighted average was 4 % and the Mexican one
10 % for before the North American Free Trade Agreement.
30It misses the usual setting of fixed effects, which capture the multilateral resistance term. These time-varying
fixed effects for each trading partner would also control for other variables such the competitiveness gained through
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complement this evidence with a back-of-the-envelope calculation and compare the two implied
effects on trade.
Keith Head and Thierry Mayer (2014, p. 165) employ such a calculation to verify the consis-
tency of estimates for the effects of regional trade agreements, tariff elasticities and tariffs in the
empirical trade literature. Analogously, we divide the world into group (A) suffering the beggar-
my-neighbour penalty of 7.5 % and (B) just paying the “normal” tariff increase of 5 % in 1932.
The following equations can then be employed to calculate the effect on trade.
ρ = (ln τAj − ln τBj ) (3.2)
τA = 1 + κ+ t+ η (3.3)
τB = 1 + κ+ t, (3.4)
where ρ is the elasticity capturing the effect of the beggar-my-neighbour penalty on trade, similar
to the elasticity estimate for trade agreements. The price elasticity  = −5.3 and κ = 0.36
capturing the ad valorem equivalent of the home preference are taken from Head and Mayer (2014,
p. 164f).31 On top of the general tariff level in 1932, t = 0.1 + 0.05 = 0.15, countries in group A
pay the additional markup of η = 0.075, which we all estimated above.
With these parameters at hand, equation (3.2) facilitates the calculation of the elasticity of the
beggar-my-neighbour penalty ρ ≈ −0.24. Just as for trade agreements, we can now calculate the
reduction in trade for the penalised group A. Trade would shrink by eρ − 1 ≈ −21.6%. Albeit
being a bit smaller, the absolute size of the effect is comparable to the one found for regional
free trade agreements in the gravity literature (Head and Mayer, 2014, p. 164f).32 Furthermore,
it is very close to the empirical estimate. Taken together, these two indicative pieces of evidence
suggest that the reorientation of trade induced by the beggar-my-neighbour penalty is about 20 %
and thus substantial.
In sum, the French retaliatory tariff response to the 1931 devaluations was fierce and the effects
on trade were large. Taking the conservative estimates, the penalty is 7.5 % ad valorem whereas
the general increase in tariffs amounted to 5 %. Both, an econometric estimate and a back-of-
the-envelope calculation, suggest that this penalty reduced trade by about 20 %. The effect is
the devaluation, exchange rate volatility or the trading partner’s GDP. Excluding them might lead to biased estimates
as we know from the gravity literature (see e.g. Head and Mayer, 2014, for a discussion of gravity specifications).
Including them, however, is not possible as their inclusion would leave no variation to base the estimate upon.
31They constitute the median point estimate in the meta study by Head and Mayer (2014).
32Given the large dispersion of estimates of the price elasticity, there is substantial insecurity in this estimate.
However, the same applies to CGE models estimating the effect of free trade agreements (Hillberry and Hummels,
2013).
20
hence not much different from the trade-creating effect of modern trade agreements - just with the
opposite sign. As 1932 marked a first plateau rather than the culmination of protectionism, the
cumulative effects of the retaliatory tit-for-tat policies that followed the devaluations of 1931 are
certainly much larger.
4. Conclusion
Currency realignments can have strong political economy implications and the 1930s provide a
blueprint for such a situation. This study has analysed their impact abroad on qualitative and em-
pirical grounds. The discussion of newspaper articles suggests that the devaluations of the 1930s
led to severe tensions that one could label as a brief trade war. It is particularly their unilateral
nature that provoked further protectionism and created strong commercial policy tensions leading
to a toxic tit-for-tat protectionist escalation. On quantitative grounds, the retaliatory response, the
beggar-my-neighbour penalty, amounted to 7.5 % ad valorem and led to a trade reduction of about
20 %. This first quantification of retaliation in the interwar period, albeit stemming from one
case study only, can provide lessons for the historiography of the Great Depression and economic
policy.
From a commercial policy perspective, the devaluations were a doubled-edged sword. Whilst
facilitating a faster recovery and less protectionism in countries depreciating (Eichengreen and
Sachs, 1985; Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010), they directly fostered substantial protectionism abroad
and opened the doors for a third phase of commercial warfare. In this phase, protectionism shifted
from a general to a discretionary nature. This is not to question the assessment by Eichengreen and
Irwin, but rather to provide a complementary explanation for protectionism in the 1930s and, per-
haps to clarify why the previous literature and contemporaries have painted a much more chaotic
picture of this commercial policy episode.
In terms of economic policy, the results of this study provide a counterexample to the oft-cited
case of 1971 ( see e.g. Krugman, 2010), when the United States successfully forced other countries
to realign their currencies by imposing an import surcharge. There is no guarantee for retaliatory
tariffs to solve currency disputes. On the contrary, the attempt to use them as a bargaining device
might fail and instead provoke ever more protectionism. After all economic policy cooperation
appears to be the best recipe to avoid disaster.
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Appendices
A. Pre-treatment Trends
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Figure 5: Pre-treatment trends
The upper two panels show the trends without colonies (the left one with the further restriction
of excluding small trading partners). The lower left panel excludes only small trading partners and
the lower right one shows the trends for the full sample. All graphs also contain the trends with
and without Cuba and Poland. Poland and France signed a new commercial agreement in 1929
(American Journal of International Law, 1929, p. 641) and the Cuban tariff rate drops from 50 to
10 percent within one year, most likely due to the change in the tariff on sugar.
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